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Abstract
In a recent paper, Creane and Miyagiwa (2008) show that the mode of competition (quantity
or price) determines whether information sharing occurs between rms and governments within
an international duopoly context in which the ms are located in di¤erent countries. In this
paper, we show that the relative number of rms located in each country is also critical. In
particular, we illustrate that with quantity competition and under the presence of demand and
cost uncertainty information sharing does not occur when the number of rms in one country is
higher than the number of rms in the other country. Moreover, we show that the informational
prisoners dilemma in the current context appears only when the number of rms across countries
is equal.
JEL classication: F12, F18, Q58.
Keywords: Information, uncertainty, strategic trade, multiple rms
Department of Economics, University of Cyprus, P.O Box , Nicosia, CY 1678, Cyprus; e-mail: fabio@ucy.ac.cy
yDepartment of Economics, University of Ioannina, P.O. Box 1186, 45110 Ioannina, Greece. Tel. (+30)
2651007198, Fax.(+30) 2651005092, e-mail: ntsak@cc.uoi.gr
zCorresponding Author.
1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Creane and Miyagiwa (2008), hereafter CM, show that the standard assumption
in the Brander-Spencer setting (see Brander and Spencer 1985), which states that governments
have complete information about the economy, is justied when rms compete over quantities.
However, the assumption of informed governments does not hold under Bertrand competition.
This is because rms have an incentive to disclose their private information regarding the exact
demand and cost levels under Cournot competition, while they do not under price competition.
Thus, the governments remain uninformed in equilibrium. This result is founded on the fact that
when the rms reveal information to the government, they adjust their subsidies accordingly. This
increases the variability of outputs and leads towards higher expected prots and welfare levels.
The analysis of CM assumes that two rms from two di¤erent countries compete in a third
country market. When CM discuss possible extensions of their model in the summary section, they
claim that the introduction of multiple rms is expected to keep the results intact. "Consider, for
example, what would occur if each country has multiple rms.... If rms compete in quantities,
then government intervention will still increase the convexity of the prot function of each rm,
thereby inducing government learning in equilibrium," Creane and Miyagiwa (2008), p. 239.1
Within a framework that is essentially that of CM but appropriately modied to deal with
multiple rms in each country, this paper shows that when rms compete over quantities, the
relative number of rms in each country is a critical determinant of information sharing between
the rms and the governments. In particular, when two countries are asymmetric in terms of the
number of rms located in each of them, information disclosure will occur only in the country that
subsidizes production, i.e., the country with relatively few rms. In the rival country, the rms will
prefer to keep information private because the government implements an export tax. When there
are several rms, CMs model applies to both information sharing and the informational prisoners
dilemma in the special case of an equal number of rms in each country. This argument aims to
provide an explanation as to why some countriesrms and governments share information and
why others do not.
1Emphasis in original.
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2 The Model
2.1 Basic Assumptions
The bones of our model are those of CM; the departure is the consideration of multiple rms in each
country. The model features two countries, Country 1 and Country 2, that export a homogeneous
good to a third market.The number of rms in Countries 1 and 2 is exogenously given by n and
m , respectively.2 Total production by the n +m rms is exported to the rest of the world. The
linear inverse demand function of the homogeneous good is p = A Pni=1 qi  Pmj=1Qj +  where
 represents a shock in demand, which follows a distribution with zero mean and variance equal to
var(). We further assume that the rms in Country 1 produce its goods with common constant
marginal costs of (ci + ui) for rms in Country 1 and (cj + uj) for rms in country 2. The terms
ui (common for the rms in Country 1) and uj (common for the rms in Country 2) are stochastic
terms revealed to the rms. They are independently distributed and follow a distribution with zero
mean and, for simplicity, variances are equal to var(ui) = var(uj) = var(u) as in the original CM
model. Country 1s government sets a subsidy (or a tax) si > 0 (si < 0) to maximize the domestic
welfare w =
Pn
i=1 i   (
Pn
i=1 siqi), where i = p()qi + siqi denote the prots of a typical rm
residing in that country. A similar game is played in Country 2.
2.2 Staging of the Game
In Stage 1 of the game, the rms and governments simultaneously decide whether they will establish
an agreement about sharing information or not. If they do, then we assume that no participant will
break up the agreement because they will incur high costs for doing so. In Stage 2, nature denes
the new values for the demand and/or the cost parameters and reveals them to the rms. If the
participants agreed in the rst stage to share information, then the rms reveal the updated statuses
of demand and costs to the governments. In Stage 3, the two governments select an optimal policy
of promoting or demoting exports through an export subsidy or export tax, respectively. Finally,
in Stage 4, the rms compete à la Cournot.
In order to determine the nal outcome, we need to compute the expected values of prots
2Throughout the paper the Country 1 variables will be denoted by lower case letters and Country 2 variables will
be denoted by upper case letters.
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and welfare for each possible contingency and then compare the individual outcomes. Because the
model evolves in four stages, we will solve it backwards.
2.3 Complete information
Here we assume that the governments and the rms agree in Stage 1 to share information. In Stage
4 the rms compete à la Cournot and thus outputs are the following:3
qi =
[(A+ )  (1 +m)(ci   si + ui) +m(cj   Sj + uj)]
(1 + n+m)
and Qj =
[(A+ )  (1 + n)(cj   Sj + uj) + n(ci   si + ui)]
(1 + n+m)
. (1)
The two governments determine the optimal policy by maximizing their national welfare, given the
fourth stage outputs from the equation (1). Therefore, we obtain:
scci =  
(n  1 m)[A+ cj(1 + n)  ci(2 + n)]
n(3 + n+m)| {z }
sBSi
  (n  1 m)
n(3 + n+m)
+
(n  1 m)ui
2n
;
and Sccj =  
(m  1  n)[A+ ci(1 +m)  cj(2 +m)]
m(3 + n+m)| {z }
SBSj
  (m  1  n)
m(3 + n+m)
+
(m  1  n)uj
2m
. (2)
The superscript cc over subsidy levels denotes that there is complete information in both countries,
while BS denotes the Brander-Spencer outcomes when var(u) = var() = 0. Assuming that the
demand intercept is su¢ ciently high to imply the existence of an interior solution, from (2), we
observe that whether a government will set a subsidy or a tax depends on the number of rms in
the two countries. For instance, the government in Country 1 will set a subsidy (tax) if and only if
n < m+ 1 (n > m+ 1). This means that a subsidy is imposed if the number of rms in a country
is less than or equal to the number of rms residing in the rival country. Hence, if the number of
rms is equal across countries then a subsidy is implemented by both governments. The fact that
the governments are informed by the rms is reected by the policy levels, which adjust accordingly
for the shocks , ui and uj .
Substituting the values given in (2) into (1) we obtain the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
3Because the rms in each country are symmetric, we anticipate that in equilibrium the level of the subsidy (tax)
will be the same for all the rms residing in the same country, in order to keep the analysis clear.
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of this game. Next, we replace the equilibrium values into Countrys 1 and 2 prot and welfare
functions and taking expectations we get:
E[cci ] = 
BS
i +
n2 + (1 +m)2
4n2
var(u) +
(1 +m)2
n2(3 + n+m)2
var();
E[ccj ] = 
BS
j +
m2 + (1 + n)2
4m2
var(u) +
(1 + n)2
m2(3 + n+m)2
var();
E[wcci ] = w
BS
i +
(1 + n+m)
4n
var(u) +
(1 +m)
n(3 + n+m)2
var()
and E[W ccj ] = w
BS
j +
(1 + n+m)
4m
var(u) +
(1 + n)
m(3 + n+m)2
var(). (3)
From (3) we observe that the expected prots and welfare levels in both countries depend positively
on var(u) and var(). This is attributed to the convexity of the prot function with respect to the
demand intercept and the marginal cost of production.
2.4 Incomplete information
When the rms and the governments do not reach an agreement about information sharing in the
rst stage, then the governments act under incomplete information. Equilibrium outputs in the
fourth stage are given again by (1). What changes is the behavior of the governments in Stage 3
where they maximize the expected welfare levels. Hence, the equilibrium policy levels follow:
snni = s
BS
i
and Snnj = S
BS
i . (4)
From (4) we observe that the subsidies in the case of the governments remaining uninformed
(denoted by nn) equal the ones of the original Brander-Spencer setting with no uncertainty (see
(2)). Substituting the values given in (4) into (1) we obtain the Bayes Nash Equilibrium of this
game. Subsequently, we replace the equilibrium values into Countrys 1 and 2 prot and welfare
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functions and taking expectations we get:
E[nni ] = 
BS
i +
1 + 2m(1 +m)
(1 + n+m)2
var(u) +
1
(1 + n+m)2
var();
E[nnj ] = 
BS
j +
1 + 2n(1 + n)
(1 + n+m)2
var(u) +
1
(1 + n+m)2
var();
E[wnni ] = w
BS
i +
1 + 2m(1 +m)
(1 + n+m)2
var(u) +
1
(1 + n+m)2
var()
and E[Wnnj ] = w
BS
j +
1 + 2n(1 + n)
(1 + n+m)2
var(u) +
1
(1 + n+m)2
var(). (5)
Again, all of the expected values depend positively on var(u) and var() due to the convexity of
the prot function with respect to , ci and cj .
The last scenario that must be examined before completing the full payo¤ matrix is the asym-
metric case in which a pair, i.e., one government and a typical rm, agrees to share information
while the rival one, i.e., the other government and a typical rm, does not. The calculations are
trivial and thus for brevity they are relegated to the Appendix.
3 Results
3.1 Information Sharing Game
So far we have determined the expected values of prots and welfare levels for the participants
in the two countries for every possible contingency. Therefore, the full payo¤ matrices that the
participants face in the rst stage are now complete. The following Lemmas provide the optimal
responses for every possible subcase both for a rm and the government residing in Country 1:
Lemma 1 With unknown marginal cost of production: (a) For the government, it is a strictly
dominant strategy to obtain information regardless of the number of rms in the two countries.
(b) For the rm, (i) if n < m + 1; it is a strictly dominant strategy to share information, (ii) if
n = m+ 1; the rm is indi¤erent, and (iii) if n > m+ 1, it is a strictly dominant strategy not to
reveal information.
Proof in Appendix
Lemma 2 With unknown demand intercept: (a) For the government, (i) if the rival pair does
not share information then the government always prefers to obtain information. (ii) If the rival
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pair shares information, then obtaining information is a strictly dominant strategy if 4+4n+n
2
n >
m+ 1 > n: If 4+4n+n
2
n = m+ 1 or m+ 1 = n then the government is indi¤erent, and if m+ 1 >
4+4n+n2
n or m + 1 < n then obtaining information yields lower expected welfare than remaining
uninformed. (b) For the rm, Lemma 1 is replicated.
Proof in Appendix
Given the optimal responses for every possible contingency we can now determine the equilibria
of the game in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 (i) The rm and the government in Country 1 share information when n < m+1;
while in Country 2 they share information when m < n + 1. (ii) If n = m + 1, then in Country
1 the rms and government are indi¤erent, while in Country 2 the rms and government agree to
share information. (iii) The rms and government in Country 1 do not share information when
n > m+ 1; while in Country 2 they do not share information when m > n+ 1.4
Proposition 1 summarizes the possible outcomes that may occur given the number of rms
located in each of the two countries. If the number of rms residing in Country 1 is less than or
equal to the number of rms in the rival country, then the rms and the government in Country 1
are expected to reach an agreement. If this is the case, then what happens in Country 2 regarding
information sharing depends on whether the number of rms in that country equals the number of
rms in Country 1. If the number of rms in both countries is the same, then information sharing
occurs in Country 2 as well. Our results generalize CM s basic result which suggests that when a
single rm is active in each country competing in quantities with the rival rm under both demand
and marginal cost uncertainty, then information sharing occurs in equilibrium in both countries. It
follows from Proposition 1 that this is true even if we allow for many rms residing in each country
as long as the number of rms is equal across the two countries. Introducing an asymmetry in the
number of rms across the two countries fundamentally alters the results.
The driving forces behind this are straightforward. From (2) we observe that the government
in Country 1 subsidizes the exporting rms when n < m+1. If n = m+1; then the optimal policy
is a zero subsidy. If n > m+ 1; then the government implements an export tax. Assuming in the
4The proof of Proposition 1 directly follows from Lemmas 1 and 2. Note also that the inequality conditions given
here denote the necessary conditions. The su¢ cient condition for Country 1 in order to have information sharing is
4+4n+n2
n
> m+ 1 > n.
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rst scenario that a rm reveals information then the government in Country 1 adjusts its policy
according to the values of  and ui. In particular, it follows from (2) that in good times (positive
 or negative ui) the subsidy increases, while in bad times it decreases. This, in turn, increases
convexity of the prot function leading to higher expected prots and welfare levels. However, if
n > m + 1; then good news forces the government to increase the tax, which translates into bad
news for the rm. In contrast, bad news leads to a reduction of the tax. Due to this governmental
behavior, exibility is reduced. Thus, expected prots and welfare levels are now lower. In this
case, the rms prefer to keep their government uninformed. This result contrasts with CMs result
that ignores the di¤erent number of rms across countries.
3.2 Informational Prisoners Dilemma
In their study CM establish the existence of an informational prisoners dilemma with demand
uncertainty and quantity competition. This means that although in equilibrium the rms and
the government in each country share information this is sub-optimal from the national welfare
perspective. On the contrary, when a government is uncertain only with respect to the marginal
cost of production, then the informational prisoners dilemma disappears. In a multiple rms
setting, an informational prisoners dilemma may occur only when, in equilibrium, the rms and
the governments agree to share information in both countries simultaneously. Given the analysis
thus far, this holds only for the case where the number of the rms in the two countries is equal,
i.e., n = m. The following Proposition summarizes these arguments for the multiple rms case:
Proposition 2 If n = m; then (a) with demand uncertainty, an informational prisoners dilemma
occurs and (b) with cost uncertainty, no informational prisoners dilemma exists.
Proof in Appendix
Not surprisingly, CMs implications about the informational prisoners dilemma are also ob-
tained in the current multiple rms framework, as long as we allow for the same number of rms
across the two countries. In the case of demand uncertainty, each government would prefer the rival
pair not to share information, irrespective of what happens in that country regarding an agreement
over information sharing. When the pair in Country 2 shares information about the exact value of
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, then the convexity of the prot function with respect to  in Country 1 decreases and the reverse
also occurs. Hence, information sharing in the two countries is undesirable.
The key feature in the case of demand uncertainty that leads to the informational prisoners
dilemma is that  is common in both countries. If, however, there is uncertainty over the rms
costs, then an informational prisoners dilemma is not present in equilibrium as suggested in part
(b) of Proposition 2. That is because the shocks in the two countries are not correlated. Now, if
the rms and the government in Country 2 agree over information sharing then any changes in uj
increase the volatility of their outputs with respect to that shock. As a result, the convexity of the
prot function for a typical rm in Country 1 with respect to uj , and thus expected welfare in that
country, increases with var(u).
For the more important cases of an asymmetric number of rms in the two countries, an
informational prisoners dilemma as dened by CM cannot occur because information sharing in
both countries does not occur in equilibrium. The reader might wonder whether this warrants
examining a modied scenario in which the residents of the two countries are not satised with the
obtained equilibrium. It is clear that this cannot be the case. Even in the imaginary scenario where
expected welfare in a country would be higher if the rival pair would decide di¤erently compared
to what it does in equilibrium, it can be shown that this would violate the optimal behavior of the
government in the rival country. Stated it di¤erently, expected welfare would be lower in the other
country. Thus, a modied version of the prisoners dilemma where the residents in both countries
are better o¤ away from the equilibrium is not feasible.
4 Discussion-Implications
A recent contribution by CM has shown that under Cournot Competition, rms have an incentive
to reveal demand and cost information to the governments, while under Bertrand competition
governments remain uninformed. Moreover, CM establish the informational prisoners dilemma
under quantity competition and unknown demand. A crucial element of their analysis is that
there is only one rm located in each country.While this assumption is a good starting point to
understand the issues, it is not the most realistic one.
This paper has introduced multiple rms in the framework of CM and has shown that when
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rms compete over quantities, the number of rms in the country is a critical determinant of
information sharing between rms and governments. Information sharing occurs in the case of
multiple rms, if the number of rms in a country is less than or equal to the number of rms in
the rival country. This means that information sharing occurs as long as a government implements
an export subsidy. Moreover, it is shown that for the special case where the number of rms is equal
in the two countries, the informational prisoners dilemma still arises under demand uncertainty,
while it does not under cost uncertainty.
The reader might wonder about extending this study to cover cases in which rms compete in
prices. This question is irrelevant because the addition of extra rms in the model will not add
anything. This is due to an export tax being the optimal policy for a government regardless of the
number of rms in the two countries (see Eaton and Grossman 1986; Section IV ).
This study is in line with CM and highlights instances where examining private information
models in strategic trade policy might be an irrelevant issue because it is resolved endogenously
under the conditions described here. This has the potential to open a new direction in the policy
instrument choice literature. For example, Cooper and Riezman (1989) illustrated that subsidies
might be preferred over quotas due to higher exibility under uncertainty. Yet, if the problem of
uncertainty is resolved, it is more than possible that quotas might gain back their advantage as a
policy instrument over subsidies.
Appendix
Calculations of Subsidies and Expected Values for the Asymmetric Case:
Given Stage 4 equilibrium outputs (1) the policy levels are the following:
scni = s
BS
i  
(n  1 m)
2n(1 +m)
+
(n  1 m)ui
2n
and Scnj = S
BS
i
snci = s
BS
i and S
cn
j = S
BS
i  
(m  1  n)
2m(1 + n)
+
(m  1  n)uj
2m
Here, the superscripts cn describe the situation in which the pair in Country 1 reach an agreement
about information sharing and the pair in Country 2 does not, and nc the reverse.
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The expected values of prots and welfare levels for Country 1 are now:
E[cni ] = 
BS
i +
2n(1 +m)3 + (1 +m)4 + n2[1 +m(2 + 5m)]
4n2(1 + n+m)2
var(u) +
1
4n2
var();
E[nci ] = 
BS
i +
5(1 +m)2 + 2(1 +m)n+ n2
4(1 + n+m)2
var(u) +
1
4(1 + n)2
var();
E[wcni ] = w
BS
i +
n2(1 +m) + (1 +m)3 + n(2 + 4m+ 6m2)
4n(1 + n+m)2
var(u) +
1
4n(1 +m)
var()
and E[wnci ] = w
BS
i +
5(1 +m)2 + 2(1 +m)n+ n2
4(1 + n+m)2
var(u) +
1
4(1 + n)2
var(). (A1)
Proof of Lemma 1:
(a) It is su¢ cient to show through the use of the relevant equations from (3), (5) and (A1) that
E[wcni ]  E[wnni ] > 0 and E[wcci ]  E[wnci ] > 0. Therefore, we get:
E[wcni ]  E[wnni ] =
(1  n+m)2(1 +m)
4n(1 + n+m)2
var(u) > 0
and E[wcci ]  E[wnci ] =
(1  n+m)2(1 +m)
4n(1 + n+m)2
var(u) > 0.
Q.E.D.
(b) Similarly we compare E[cni ]  E[nni ] and E[cci ]  E[nci ]. We obtain:
E[cni ]  E[nni ] =
(m+ 1  n)(1 + 3n+m)(1 +m)2
4n2(1 + n+m)2
var(u)
and E[cci ]  E[nci ] =
(m+ 1  n)(1 +m)2(1 +m+ 3n)
4n2(1 + n+m)2
var(u).
(i) If n < 1+m) E[cni ] E[nni ] > 0 and E[cci ] E[nci ] > 0, (ii) If n = 1+m) E[cni ] E[nni ] =
0 and E[cci ]  E[nci ] = 0 and (iii) If n > 1 +m ) E[cni ]  E[nni ] > 0 and E[cci ]  E[nci ] < 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:
(a) Doing similar calculations with those of the previous Lemma, we get:
(i)
E[wcni ]  E[wnni ] =
(1  n+m)2
4n(1 +m)(1 + n+m)2
var() > 0.
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(ii)
E[wcci ]  E[wnci ] =  
(n  1 m)[4 + n(3 m+ n)]
4n(1 + n)2(3 + n+m)2
var().
If n < m+1 and 4+n(3 m+n) > 0, 4+3n+n2n > m, 4+3n+n
2
n +1 > m+1, 4+4n+n
2
n > m+1
) E[wcci ]   E[wnci ] > 0. If n = m + 1 or 4+4n+n
2
n = m + 1 ) E[wcci ]   E[wnci ] = 0. Finally, if
m+ 1 > 4+4n+n
2
n or n > m+ 1) E[wcci ]  E[wnci ] < 0. Q.E.D.
(b) We compare E[cni ]  E[nni ] and E[cci ]  E[nci ]:
E[cni ]  E[nni ] =
(m+ 1  n)(1 + 3n+m)
4n2(1 + n+m)2
var()
and E[cci ]  E[nci ] =
(m+ 1  n)(2 + n)[2(1 +m) + n(5 + n+ 3m)]
4(3 + n+m)2(n+ n2)2
var().
(i) If n < 1+m) E[cni ] E[nni ] > 0 and E[cci ] E[nci ] > 0, (ii) If n = 1+m) E[cni ] E[nni ] =
0 and E[cci ]   E[nci ] = 0 and (iii) If n > 1 +m ) E[cni ]   E[nni ] < 0 and E[cci ]   E[nci ] < 0
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
(a) We set var(u) = 0. Then:
E[wcci ]  E[wnni ] =
[1  4n(1 + n)]
n(3 + 4n(2 + n))2
var() < 0 as n  1:
Alternatively, it can be shown as in CM that E[wcci ] E[wcni ] < 0 and E[wnni ] E[wnci ] > 0 Q.E.D.
(b) We set var() = 0. Then:
E[wcci ]  E[wnni ] =
(1 + 2n+ 4n2)
4n(1 + 2n)2
var(u) > 0 as n  1.
Alternatively it can be shown as in CM that E[wcci ] E[wcni ] > 0 and E[wnni ] E[wnci ] < 0 Q.E.D.
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